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general acceptance, nor were those who adopted them able to point to much success against the *tercios*. Maurice's reforms, indeed, were a revolution that stopped half-way, and their lack of success on the battlefield is to be attributed to that fact. They made little real advance towards solving the problem of combining firepower and shock; they left cavalry still in the hands of the pistolers;¹ and above all they were essentially defensive in spirit, for Maurice shared to the full the contemporary dislike of battle. It was left to Gustavus Adolphus to remedy most of the defects of Maurice's system, and in doing so to stereotype European warfare in that linear pattern which it retained, on the whole, until our own day.

The essential contribution of Gustavus Adolphus was, to demonstrate the ability of linear formations to defeat mass, not only in defence, but in attack. And he did this by combining firepower and shock as nobody had been able to do since firearms replaced bows, while developing the characteristic offensive qualities of each arm. The pike was rehabilitated, for the last time, as an offensive, battle-winning, weapon; but at the same time it was linked in the closest tactical combination with musketeers. And the effectiveness of the musketeers was secured by the device of the salvo,² which replaced the desultory rolling fire of the countermarch. The characteristic method of his last period, whether for attack or defence, whether for horse or foot, was an alternation of missile shock and mass impact. And this in turn implied the emancipation of cavalry from the caracole, and a return to its natural reliance upon the weight of man and horse to disrupt enemy formations. At the same time, the effectiveness of missile support was revolutionized, first by the use of a light three-pounder gun, which, since it could be manhandled, could be used in intimate collaboration with infantry; and secondly by decisive improvements in the mobility of field artillery.³ All these advances rested upon a thorough reform of military administration, along lines later to be familiar to Le Tellier and Louvois, and upon a discipline and drill which were superior even to the Dutch. Gustavus took over the smaller units of the Maurician system, with

1. In 1597 Maurice abolished the lance in his armies: Wijn, p. 45.
2. The salvo, as its name implies, originated as a ceremonial salute, and it is so that Wallhausen, for instance, describes it: J. J. Wallhausen, *L'Art militaire pour l'Infanterie*, (Oppenheim, 1615), pp. 156-7. But it seems to have been used in action soon after this, apart from its use by Gustavus: at Breitenfeld, for instance, the Saxon army fired a salvo; but they fired at too long a range, and it was ineffective. Gustavus, using the salvo at short or point-blank range, was the first commander properly to exploit its possibilities.
3. L. Hammerskiöld, 'Ur svenska artilleriets hävder', *Artilleri-Tidskrift*, 1941-4, *passim*; *Sveriges krig 1611-1632*, supplementary vol. II.

their minor articulations; but he stabilized, as Maurice had not been able to do, the relationship between the tactical and administrative unit,¹ and above all he developed the initiative of subalterns and N.C.O.'s in an entirely novel manner. The importance of the platoon-commander begins with Gustavus; and all the manuals on section-leading in attack and defence may justly claim him as their progenitor.

The battles of Breitenfeld, Wittstock, Rocroi and Jankow marked the success of the revolution. They revealed the recovery of the art of war from the debility which had been the result of the invention of firearms. They laid down the pattern which warfare would follow until the close of the eighteenth century. And they entailed consequences of the most far-reaching kind.

The most obvious of these were purely military. The soldier of the middle ages had been, on the whole, an individualist; and he (and his horse) had been highly trained over a prolonged period. The coming, first of firearms, then of the Swiss column, put an end to this state of affairs. The mercenary in the middle of a pike-square needed little training and less skill: if he inclined his pike in correct alignment and leaned heavily on the man in front of him, he had done almost all that could be required of him.² So too with the musketeer: a certain dexterity in loading, a certain steadiness in the ranks, sufficed to execute the countermarch, since no one could reasonably demand of a musket that it should be aimed with accuracy. The training of a Bowman, schooled to be a dead shot at a distance, would be wasted on so imperfect an instrument as an arquebus or a wheel-lock pistol; and the pike, unlike the lance, was not an individual weapon at all. One reason why firearms drove out the bow and the lance was precisely this, that they economized on training.³ Moreover, deep formations, whether of horse or foot, dispensed with the need for a large trained corps of officers, and required a less high morale, since it is difficult to run away with fifteen ranks behind you.

1. Barkman, *Gustaf Adolfs regementsorganisation*, p. 38; contrast Wijn, p. 437, and E. von Frauenholz, *Das Söldnertum in der Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, (Munich, 1938), I. 46.
2. "Non bisogna credere che l'addestramento dei combattanti richieda tempo e spese: non ci sono esercizi di piazza d'armi nel senso moderno. Una sia pur rudimentale istruzione permette agli Svizzeri di formare dei corpi tattici . . .": Pieri, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
3. There were many reasons for the decline of the lance, but this was certainly one of them: see Raimondo Montecuccoli, *Mémoires*, (Strasbourg, 1735), p. 16; and cf. J. J. Wallhausen, *Art militaire à cheval*, (Frankfort, 1616), pp. 3-22.

