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Auteur : Foucault, Michel

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The reforms of Maurice inaugurated a real, and a lasting, revolution in these matters. Maurice's small units had to be highly trained in manoeuvre; they needed many more officers and N.C.O.s to lead them. The tactics of Gustavus postulated a vastly improved fire-discipline, and long practice in the combination of arms. The sergeant-major of the *tercio* had been well content if he mastered the art of "embattling by the square-root";¹ the sergeant-major of Maurice's army must be capable of executing a great number of intricate parade-ground evolutions, based on Roman models,² besides a number of battle-movements of more strictly practical value. For Londoño drill and exercises had been designed primarily to promote physical fitness; for Lipsius they were a method of inculcating Stoic virtues in the soldier; for Maurice they were the fundamental postulates of tactics. From Aelian Maurice borrowed the whole vocabulary of military command, transmitting it almost unaltered to our own day.³ Contemporaries found in the new drill which he introduced a strange and powerful fascination: it was an "invention", a "science",⁴ indeed, a revelation. The age surrendered itself to it, as to a new and subtle intoxicant; and a large literature appeared, designed to explain to the aspiring soldier, in two pages of close print, the precise significance of the order "right turn"—a service the more necessary, since it sometimes meant, in fact, turn left.⁵ And so officers became not merely leaders, but trainers, of men; diligent practice in peace-time, and in winter, became essential; and drill, for the first time in modern history, became the precondition for military success. And since individual initiative was expected at a far lower level of command than ever before; and since the slowly-increasing technical complexity of firearms was already beginning the process of forcing the soldier to be (on however primitive a level) a technician; the revolution in drill, while it implied a new subordination of the soldier's will to the command

1. i.e. the art of drawing up a given number of men into a perfect square. There is a description in Turner, *Pallas Armata*, pp. 266-8.

2. e.g. "The Quadrate or Square, the Wedg, the Tenaille or Tongs, the Saw, and the Globe": Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-4.

3. Hahlweg, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-93, 110-6; Wijn, pp. 74, 138-40, 430; H. Wertheim, *Der toller Halberstädter. Herzog Christian von Braunschweig im pfälzischen Kriege*, (Berlin, 1929), I, 116. Jähns suggested that Maurice's reforms may have been forced on him by the great wastage of trained soldiers during protracted hostilities in a small area, and the consequent need to use untrained men. But the old style would have suited untrained men much better. Max Jähns, *Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens von der Urzeit bis zu Renaissance*, (Leipzig, 1880), p. 1207.

4. Wallhausen, *L'Art militaire pour l'Infanterie*, p. 65.

5. Jähns, p. 1208.

of a superior, implied also intelligent subordination. Henceforth it might not be the soldier's business to think, but he would at least be expected to possess a certain minimal capacity for thinking. The army was no longer to be a brute mass, in the Swiss style, nor a collection of bellicose individuals, in the feudal style; it was to be an articulated organism of which each part responded to impulses from above. The demand for unanimity and precision of movement led naturally to the innovation of marching in step, which appears at some date impossible to establish about the middle of the seventeenth century.¹ And the principle of mass-subordination, of the solution of the individual will in the will of the commander, received a last reinforcement with the slow adoption of uniforms: "without uniforms", said Frederick the Great, "there can be no discipline." The process was already observable in the 1620's; but it was scarcely complete by the end of the century. The long delay is easily

1. This matter of marching in step needs proper investigation. The only discussion appears to be E. Sander, 'Zur Geschichte des Gleichschrittes', *Zeitschrift für Heeres- und Uniformkunde* (1935) which is unreliable. Sander, as a result of a misreading of Francis Grose, *The Military Antiquities of Great Britain* (1812), I, 345, attributes the credit for the idea to the Earl of Essex, on the strength of a sentence which he believes to be contained in *A Worthy Speech spoken by his Excellency the Earl of Essex* (1642). But the quotation is in fact (as Grose plainly states) from the Regulations of 1686; and confidence in Sander's views is not much restored by his suggestion (p. 121) that marching in step was the "gegebene Form" for armies of the Nordic Race. The date 1686 seems very late for the origin of the practice. It has indeed been said that it was Leopold of Dessau who made it the rule in the Prussian army (W. Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, I, 345); but it seems possible that it was used much earlier. The Swiss columns and the *tercios*, though they marched to tap of drum, do not seem to have kept step; and such reproductions of Callot's etchings as I have seen suggest that the armies of the Thirty Years' War did not keep step either. Wallhausen says nothing of it in his chapter on marching (Wallhausen, *L'Art militaire pour l'Infanterie*, pp. 121-4); nor does Monro (*Monro His Expedition* (London, 1637), II, 190). But whatever may have been the case on the march, it seems quite certain that the infantry of the early seventeenth century kept step for drill. Thus Wallhausen writes (*op. cit.*, p. 73): "Tenez le pied gauche coy, conversez vous en reculant le pied droit"; and E. D. Davies, in *The Art of War and Englands Traynings* (1619) is even more explicit: "The Captaine commands, *Files to the right hand Counter march*, and then the Leaders of the Files advancing with their right legges, turn to the right hand, and march downe towards the Reare . . ." (p. 194). Indeed, it might be possible to argue from Davies that English soldiers already kept step on the march: "Let him march then with a good grace, holding vp his head gallantly, his pace full of grauitie and state . . . and that which most imports, is that they haue alwaies their eies vpon their companions which are in ranke with them, and before them going iust one with the other, and keeping perfit distance without committing error in the least pace *or step* [my italics]" (p. 76). This may be to attach too much importance to a mere flower of Davies' exuberant style; but it seems very probable that pikemen, at least, could not afford to be out of step when marching in close order, for the position of the pike when held at the trail, and its extreme length, would otherwise have been liable to imperil the haunches of the man in front: See Davies' description, *loc. cit.*

