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explained. As long as body-armour remained general, uniforms were scarcely practical; and even when armour was abandoned, the common use of the sword-resisting buff-coat prevented for a time a general change.¹ Moreover, the habit of using mercenary armies, and the notorious readiness of mercenaries to change sides, induced men to prefer the "token"—a kerchief round the arm, a green branch in the hat—which could be discarded easily as the occasion for it passed. Nevertheless, by the time that Louvois was well in the saddle it was sufficiently plain that the general adoption of uniforms would not long be delayed.² The way was clear for the armies of the nineteenth century: it remained only for the twentieth to complete the process by replacing dolmans, busbies, eagle's wings, and all the flaunting *panache* of Cossack and Hussar, by the flat uniformity of field-grey and khaki.

The tactical reforms of Gustavus were accompanied by—and indeed lent themselves to—a revolution in strategy whose consequences were no less important. The sixteenth century had already seen a notable broadening of strategic horizons: in the long duel between Valois and Habsburg, simultaneous operations on two or more fronts had been the rule, and it would have been difficult at times to decide which was the encircler, and which the encircled. The same was true, on a vaster scale, of the struggle against the Turks: Portuguese attacks on Eritrea, Persian assaults upon Asia Minor, were balanced by Turkish alliances with France and England. At the same time the discovery of the New World, and the penetration of the East Indies, extended the possible area of European conflict until it covered most of the globe, and inaugurated a new age of amphibious warfare. But these developments were for long unsystematic, the realm of the project-maker and the arm-chair strategist: the day had not yet arrived when the military and naval administrations of Europe were equal to the coördination of effort over distances so formidable. The sterility of warfare in Europe, in the time of Prince Maurice, is the accurate measure of the strategic thinking of the age.

1. "Il n'y a pas un Cavalier dans les troupes de France, qui n'ait un habillement de Buffe, depuis que l'on s'est défait de ceux de fer": Gaya, *Traité des Armes*, (Paris, 1678), p. 56.
2. R. Knötel, H. Knötel and J. Sieg: *Handbuch der Uniformkunde. Die militärische Tracht in ihrer Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart*, (Hamburg, 1937) is a standard history. The authors consider that there were no true uniforms before about the middle of the century; but it is possible to dispute this view: see, e.g., Wertheim, *op. cit.*, I. 94; Frauenholz, *Söldnertum*, I. 41-2; Rockstroh, I. 18, 52-3.

The Thirty Years' War brought a change. Battle came again into favour, perhaps under the influence of confessional ardour, and with it a strategy aiming at battle; and as hostilities ranged back and forth over Germany, and along the borders of Germany from Poland and Transylvania to Italy, Lorraine and the Netherlands, commanders were driven to look at the whole of central Europe as one great theatre of war. When Gustavus Adolphus wrote that "all the wars of Europe are now blended into one",¹ he was thinking in terms of politics; but the remark was equally true in regard to strategy. Wallenstein sends Arnim to fight on the Vistula; Pappenheim rushes to the relief of Maestricht; Olivares dreams of seizing Göteborg, and of a Spanish naval base at Wismar, to be made accessible by a Kiel canal;² Piccolomini makes a famous march from Flanders to Bohemia;³ Savoy, Venice, Transylvania and even the Tartars of the Crimea become elements in ever-wider and more unified plans of operations. Above all, Gustavus achieves the successful combination of two types of strategy: on the one hand a resolute offensive strategy designed to annihilate the enemy in battle—the product of confidence in the superiority of the new Swedish tactics; on the other a wholly new gradualist strategy, designed to conquer Germany by the occupation and methodical consolidation of successive base-areas. The two blend in his plan for the destruction of the Austrian Habsburgs by the simultaneous and effectively coördinated operations of five or seven armies moving under the king's direction on an enormous curving front extending from the middle Oder to the Alpine passes.⁴ This was a strategic concept more complex, vaster, than any one commander had ever previously attempted. His death prevented its being carried out; but the closing years of the war saw other developments of interest. The strategy of devastation began to be employed with a thoroughness and logic rarely surpassed; and, as its consequence, the war became pre-eminently a war of movement, best exemplified in the

1. Axel Oxenstiernas *Skrifter och Brefväxling*, (Stockholm, 1888—), II, i. 396.
2. The Kiel canal was Wallenstein's idea. It is noteworthy that the biggest canal enterprise of the century—the Canal des deux Mers, linking Bordeaux with the Mediterranean—was essentially a strategic work.
3. In 1639: one of the great military feats of the war: see Birger Steckzén, *Johan Baner*, (Stockholm, 1939), p. 330.
4. Lars Tingsten, 'Några data angående Gustaf II Adolfs basering och operationsplaner i Tyskland 1630-1632', *Historisk Tidskrift*, I Series, XLVIII (1938); *Sveriges krig 1611-1632*, V. 282-4, 314, 330-8; VI. 7, 33-4, 179, 259.

