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[Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, p. 14-15]

Auteur : Foucault, Michel

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campaigns of Baner, Torstensson and Gallas.¹ Not all of these developments were to be pursued in the years that followed: an age of reason and mathematical logic would try to bring war itself within the scope of its calculations, to the detriment of that offensive spirit without which wars cannot be won; but the effects of the strategic revolution of which Gustavus was the most illustrious exponent were not to be effaced.

The most important of them was a marked increase in the scope of warfare, reflected in a corresponding increase in the normal size of the armies of the major powers. Philip II had dominated Europe with the aid of an army which probably did not exceed 40,000 men: a century later, 400,000 were esteemed necessary to maintain the ascendancy of Louis XIV.² In 1627, under the Elector George William, Brandenburg possessed a defence-force totalling 900:³ under Frederick William I, the normal establishment was about 80,000. The previous millennium could show nothing to compare with this sudden rise in the size of western European armies. Great agglomerations of troops for a particular occasion had indeed occurred in the past, and the Turks had brought vast hosts to bear upon their enemies; but in the West, at least, the seventeenth century saw the permanent establishment of some armies at levels which earlier ages had rarely, if ever, known. With Louvois, indeed, the passion for mere numbers had something of a megalomaniac quality: an aspect, perhaps, of that "pursuit of the quantitative" which has been considered as an essential characteristic of the new industrialism.⁴ It may perhaps be legitimately objected that the instances I have chosen to illustrate the growth of armies are hand-picked: the Spanish armies of 1690 were certainly no bigger than those of 1590; and the army with which Charles XII won the battle of Narva was slightly smaller than that with which

Charles IX lost the battle of Kirkholm:¹ that Gustavus Adolphus had 175,000 men under arms in 1632 was for Sweden a quite exceptional circumstance, never repeated. But this does not alter the fact that the scale of European warfare was throughout the century prodigiously increasing: the great armies of Louis XIV had to be met by armies of comparable size; and if one state could not manage it, there must be a Grand Alliance. Moreover, in the seventeenth century numbers had acquired a precise meaning: when Charles V is credited with assembling an army of 120,000 men to repel the Turkish attack, we are perhaps entitled to decline to take the figure too literally; but when Louvois states the French army at 300,000, it is safe to assume that there was just that number on the muster-rolls, even though not all of them may have appeared in the ranks. And so it happened that (as Montecuccoli observed) men, no less than money, became in the seventeenth century the sinews of war;² and one of the earliest concerns of an emergent demography would be to reassure monarchs anxious for their manpower-income. Not for nothing did the mercantilists, with their eyes ever upon the contingency of war, account a copious population among the chief riches of the state.

The increase in the scope of warfare, the expansion of armies, and the new tactics themselves, all made necessary the evolution of an improved military administration. The Austrian Habsburgs had possessed a *Hofkriegsrat* since the mid-sixteenth century; but in the seventeenth the rising military powers—Sweden, France, Brandenburg, Russia—all equipped themselves with new and better machinery for the conduct of war. Even so, the problem of feeding and supplying armies of great size, especially when operating at a distance from their bases, was at first beyond their capacity. The Thirty Years' War was fought by armies which, save in a few special cases, were indifferent to a strategic threat to their lines of communication, since they were under no illusions as to the ability of their governments to supply them. "If we cannot say, *bellum se ipsum alet*", wrote Gustavus Adolphus, "I see no way out of what we are engaged in".³ Armies must live off the country; and Wallenstein, in particular, developed the technique of doing so to a pitch at which

1. B. Steckzén, *Baner*, pp. 208, 332, 342; Piero Pieri, 'La formazione dottrinale di Raimondo Montecuccoli', *Rivista internazionale d'histoire militaire*, X (1951), 100, 110: "la guerra cessa per sfinitimento, attraverso una strategica logoratrice sempre più crudele e implacabile"; and cf. Per Sörensson, 'Fältherrarn, härorganisation och krigsföring under trettioåriga krigets senare skede. En orientering', *Scandia*, III (1930) *passim*.

2. R. Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de España y de la Civilización española*, (Barcelona, 1927), III, 295; J. Colin and J. Reboul, *Histoire militaire et navale* (= *Histoire de la Nation française*, ed. G. Hanotaux, VII), (Paris, 1925), I, 428, 432, 433; General Weygand, *Turenne*, (Paris, 1934), p. 98.

3. C. Jany, *Geschichte der Königlich preussischen Armee* (Berlin, 1928), I, 53.

4. J. U. Nef, *La Naissance de la Civilization industrielle*, (Paris, 1955), *passim*.

1. The Swedes had 10,800 at Kirkholm; "at most 10,000" at Narva: G. B. C:sson Barkman, *Svea Liugardets historia* (Stockholm, 1938-9), II, 537; Rudolf Fähræus, *Karl XI och Karl XII*, (Stockholm, 1923), p. 338.

2. Pieri, 'Formazione dottrinale di . . . Montecuccoli', p. 114.

3: C. G. Styffe, *Konung Gustaf II Adolfs skrifter* (Stockholm, 1861), p. 520.

