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not the only one) the crown's need for money; and that need was usually produced by military commitments whose dimensions were in part the result of the military revolution. On the whole, the monarchs prevailed; the income for maintaining standing armies was taken out of control of the Estates; sometimes military finance—as in Brandenburg—was wholly separated from the ordinary revenues. And in Germany this issue of the conflict resulted, in part, from the fact that in the last resort the Estates had rather sacrifice a constitutional principle, and retain the security afforded by a standing army, than risk the appalling sufferings and crushing financial exactions which, as the experience of the Thirty Years' War had shown, awaited the militarily impotent or old-fashioned.¹ Sweden, with her relatively inexpensive conscript army, escaped this constitutional crux, and her Estates were in consequence able to weather a period of semi-absolutist rule: the contrast with the constitutional history of Brandenburg is a reflection of the differences in the military organization of the two countries. Nevertheless, though the standing army thus came to be accepted as the lesser of two evils, it was a grievous burden to the smaller and financially weaker states. They had discarded the alternative of a militia; a standing army seemed inescapable; but many of them could scarcely finance it from their own resources. It was this situation which presented such opportunities to that subsidy-diplomacy upon which the aggressive policies of Louis XIV were to thrive.

If liberty, then, were thus to be sacrificed to the army, it ought at least to be an army that was really the property of the king, and not a mere agglomeration of recruiting speculators. The free bargaining between recruiting captain and employing prince, the Articles of War which partook more of the nature of an industrial agreement than of a code of military discipline,²—these things were repugnant to the orderliness and efficiency of the new military ideal. The larger the army, the greater the need for disciplining it from above.³ The monarch must take over the business of recruiting and paying men, as he was already beginning to take over the business of supplying material and supervising war-industries. And the monarchs, in fact, did so. The Articles of War of Gustavus

1. The point is well made in M. Ritter, 'Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins', pp. 248-9.
2. G. Droysen, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens in Deutschland während der Epoche des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, (Hanover, 1875), pp. 28-31, for the resemblances between a mercenary company and a gild.
3. Andrzejewski, p. 96.

Adolphus set a new standard of royal control, and were imitated even in countries which employed a predominantly mercenary army.¹ In curbing the independence of the recruiting colonels a start was made by Wallenstein;² and a generation later Louvois and the Great Elector were to profit from his example.³ By the end of the century the monarchs had mostly gained effective control of their armies. It was a significant development; for once the armies became royal (as the navies already were) the way was open for their eventually becoming national.

The social consequences of the military revolution were scarcely less important than the constitutional. In the middle ages war had been almost the privilege of a class; by the seventeenth century it had become almost the livelihood of the masses. The Military Participation Ratio (to borrow the language of the sociologists⁴) rose sharply. Men flocked to the swollen mercenary armies. In part they did so, no doubt, because in the Germany of the 1630's and 1640's the army was the safest place to be;⁵ but also, and more generally, because the new warfare offered fresh prospects of a career. Never before had commanders required so many subalterns and N.C.O.s: it was no wonder that impoverished Scots and Irish made all haste to the wars of Low Germanie, and that "the dollar of Mackay" passed into a Gaelic proverb.⁶ The cavalry, which had once been the close preserve of the nobility, was now open to all who could sit a horse and fire a pistol; for with the abolition of

1. Text in J. Schmedeman, *Kungl. Stadgar, Förordningar, Bref och Resolutioner etc.*, (Stockholm, 1706), pp. 15 ff.; English version in *The Swedish Discipline*, (1632), pp. 39-72; and see A. Gierow, *Bidrag till det svenska militärkyrköväsendets historia*, (Uppsala, 1918), I, 21-79; O. Brusiin, 'Gustaf II Adolfs krigsartiklar', *Tidskrift utg. av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland*, 79 (1943), 373-93; K. Grönfors, 'Ur det svenska militära rättegångsväsendets historia', *Rättshistoriska studier*, II Series, I, 208-43.
2. V. Loewe, *Die Organisation und Verwaltung der Wallensteinischen Heere*, (Freiburg i. B., 1895), pp. 22-4.
3. L. André, *Michel Le Tellier et Louvois*, (Paris, 1942), pp. 327-40; Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945*, (Oxford, 1955), pp. 5-6.
4. The term is Andrzejewski's.
5. Especially for those who lived on a main traffic artery: one major cause in the decline in the population of Coburg during the period was enlistment. G. Franz, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk*, (Jena, 1943), p. 41.
6. T. A. Fischer, *The Scots in Germany: being a contribution towards the History of the Scots abroad*, (Edinburgh, 1902), p. 74, gives the proverb in the original, with the translation, "He who is down on his luck can always get a dollar from Mackay". Cf. the Scots ballad
First they took my brethren twain, Then wiled my love from me,
O, woe unto the cruel wars In Low Germanie!
See B. Hoening, *Memoiren Englischer Officiere im Heere Gustaf Adolfs und ihr Fortleben in der Literatur*, in *Beitr. z. neueren Philologie J. Schipper dargebracht*, (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 324-50.

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