[Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, p. 28-29]

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must be created to teach it: the first military academy of modern times was founded by John of Nassau at Siegen in 1617. The need for military education was especially felt by the nobility, whose former supremacy in arms was beginning to be challenged; and the century saw the foundation of noble academies or cadet-schools, which sought to combine the now-gentlemanly acquirement of fortification, with the Italian tradition of courtly education: such were Christian IV's Sorø, Louvois' short-lived cadet-school, and the similar Austrian establishment, founded in 1648 by the ominously-named Baron de Chaos.[1]

Side by side with the older stratification of society based upon birth or tenure, there now appeared a parallel and to some extent a rival stratification based on military and civil rank. The first half of the seventeenth century sees the real emergence of the concept of rank. In the armies of the Landsknechts, for instance, the distinction between officers and men had been faint, and their bands had at times something of the aspect of a self-governing democracy.[2] All that was now changed. After captains came colonels; then (in the Thirty Years' War) majors; then a regular hierarchy of generals and field-marshals. Soon after 1660 Louvois regulated precedence in the French army.[3] And this hierarchization was the more necessary, since very soon military ranks were drawn into that general sale of offices which was one of the vices of the age. On the whole, the parallel hierarchies of rank and birth avoided conflict: the nobility contrived to evade non-commissioned service, and the locution "an officer and a gentleman" became a pleonasm rather than a nice distinction; but in some countries at least (Sweden and Russia in particular) the state found it expedient to promulgate Tables of Rank, in order to adjust delicate questions of precedence as between (for instance) a second lieutenant and a university professor. Thus the officer-corps is born; a European, supra-national entity, with its own ethos, its own international code of honour, its own corporate spirit. The *duellum* of a dying chivalry is transformed into the affair of honour of a military caste. And the military revolution is seen to have given birth, not only to modern warfare, but also to modern militarism.

The effect of war upon the economic development of Europe in this period is one of the classic battlefields of historians—a "dark and bloody ground" whereon Professor Nef still grapples pertinaciously with the ghost of Werner Sombart, much as Jacob wrestled with the angel[1]—and it would be rash for one who is not an economic historian to intrude upon this argument. But this at least may be said: that war was a fundamental presupposition of mercantilist thought, and by many mercantilists was considered to be necessary to the health of the state; and implicit in all their theories was the new concept of war-potential.[2] The mercantilists held that the economic activities of the state must be so directed as to ensure that it be not at the mercy of a foreign power for those commodities—whether men, money, or goods—without which wars cannot be waged: Thomas Mun, for instance, urged the stockpiling of strategic raw materials.[3] And when mercantilist writers in France and England and Austria, and even in Sweden, boasted that their respective countries excelled all others in fertility of soil and mineral wealth, they were in fact proclaiming their preparedness for war, and warning off an aggressor. But since few states could be truly autarkic, there arose, more clearly than ever before, the idea of economic warfare; the more so, since the needs of armies were now greater and more varied. There had, of course, been conscious economic warfare before: repeated attempts had been made to cut off the Turks from supplies of war-materials; in the 1570's and 1580's similar attempts were made to deny them to Muscovy; Sweden had been hard hit in the Seven Years' War of the North by the Danes' stoppage of her imports of salt. But in the seventeenth century economic warfare becomes wider in range, shrewder, and more effective, than ever before. This increased efficacy is a consequence (but also a cause) of larger navies, and of the building of ships with a greater sea-endurance. It implied, moreover, state-navies; for privateering, though it continued, became less an element in naval strategy than a form of investment, as for instance the Dutch West India Company was. It was a sign of the new scope of economic warfare that the Dutch in 1599 not only declared a total blockade of the entire coasts of Italy, Portugal and Spain, but also proceeded to a serious attempt to make that blockade effective.[4] At the same

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[1] Sjöstrand, pp. 177-83; Wijn, pp. 74-80; Vagts, pp. 53-4; Heischmann, pp. 211-3.

[2] Loewe, pp. 18-25.

[3] André, *Le Tellier et Louvois*, pp. 317-21; and (on the emergence of rank) see Wijn, pp. 62-73; Frauenholz, *Söldnertum*, I. 28-9; Sjöstrand, p. 71.

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[1] See Werner Sombart, *Krieg und Kapitalismus*, (Berlin, 1913); J. U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (1950).

[2] For this aspect of mercantilism, see Edmond Silberner, *La Guerre dans la Pensée économique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1939).

[3] *ibid.*, p. 99

[4] J. E. Elias, *Het Voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog*, I. 141-2.