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Incidentally, the expulsion from Syria involved all philosophers, and the letter of expulsion by a King Antiochus is authentic, in spite of L. Radermacher's suspicions (*Rh. Museum* lvi, 1901, 202): Antiochus VI killed the Epicurean Diogenes of Seleucia (*Athen.* v, 211).

The statement by such an authority as E. Bignone that 'Epicuro era democratico' (*L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* i, 106) is certainly incorrect. Epicurus' theory of the social contract could approve of democracy as well as any other non-tyrannical State. For himself, Epicurus devoted particular attention to Kingship in a treatise *περί βασιλείας*, possibly in discussion with Aristotle (Bignone, *o.c.* ii, 541). This, however, was the State for the majority, not for the philosopher. Epicurus' fine appreciation of the necessity of political life always separated the philosopher from the crowd. To the philosopher the existence of the State was only the condition for his own peace: *οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κείνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται* (fr. 530 Usener = 81 Bailey). The State had to be good, if the philosopher was to remain aloof from it—*μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι* (fr. 548, 554, 556 U.; 85, 87 B. etc.). Tyranny was not an occupation a philosopher might choose (*Vita Ep.* 119), but to pay court to a king, if occasion demanded, was good (*ib.* 121b). Epicurus himself steered cleverly among Hellenistic kings (*cf. Riv. Fil. Class.* lxiii, 1935, 302 and Bignone). The liberty of the philosopher, as Metrodorus put it, was to be free of the State: *διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει τὸν ἐλεύθερον ὡς ἀληθῶς γέλῳτα γελάσαι ἐπὶ τε δὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς Λυκούργοις τούτοις καὶ Σόλῳσιν* (Plut. *Adv. Colot.* 33, p. 1127 C = fr. 32 Körte). That the true Epicurean ought not to have any political activity was still the firm conviction of Philodemus (for instance, *Vol. Rhet.* ii, 12, 8; 28, 7 Sudhaus). He neatly distinguished the qualities of the politician from those of the philosopher. However, not only did he fail to persuade his pupils and friends, but, as we saw, his escape from political passions was narrow and incomplete.

The point of view entirely different from the traditional outlook of the school may be seen in Cassius. He interpreted virtue in an active sense: *Λάθε βιώσας* did not appeal to him. His letter *Fam.* xv, 19 was no empty word, as Appian knew, probably from Messalla: *ἐν δὲ ταῖς φροντίσι καὶ πόνοις ὁ μὲν Κάσσιος ἀμεταστρεπτή, καθάπερ ἐς τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν οἱ μονομαχοῦντες, ἐς μόνον τὸν πόλεμον ἀφεῶρα* (iv, 133, 561). The problem, consequently, is how Roman Epicureans could reconcile their political enthusiasms with their philosophical allegiance. Working with Caesar might suit the peaceful mood of the school; but fighting against Caesar and his heirs was certainly not in the tradition. One still gathers from the quoted letters of Cicero and from Plutarch that this was an argument frequently discussed—*on πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι* (*cf. also Ad Att.* xiv, 6). Yet on the whole it is apparent that fighting against tyranny was considered legitimate by the Roman Epicureans.

The explanation is to be found partly in the irrational. Enthusiasm for freedom explodes many doctrinal barriers. 44 B.C. was a year of enthusiasms rooted in centuries of Republican history. The break with the Epicurean tradition became, however, easier and was not clearly perceived because something in this doctrine might be interpreted in a revolutionary sense. One of the most famous sayings of the school was that tyrants by all their violence could not destroy the internal happiness of the wise man (*Vita Epic.* 118; *cf. fr.* 509; 601 ff. Usener). Now the tyrant was there, the Roman Epicureans took the doctrine at its face value. *Non vultus instantis tyranni* ceased to be a commonplace and became an experience. Death must be despised, as Epicurus had taught them to despise it. The texts of Philodemus and Varius on death have already been mentioned. Tyranny was itself a touchstone for endurance and, moreover, directly violated the virtue of *παρρησία*. This *παρρησία*, although it had become a very homely



