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## [H. North. Sôphrosune. Chapter VII - suite]

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Sophrosyne

1966.

↑ Prof. Zenon Chryssipp & Pantheus, Poseidonius affirme que l'hégeonotikon ou l'âme, n'est pas rationnel, mais irrationnel ou *neurymetikon* (*Philosophy after Plato*)

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faculties as well.<sup>81</sup> Only the excellence of the rational element (*logikon*) constitutes *epistêmê* (or *phronêsis*) and can be imparted by teaching. The *aretae* of the irrational faculties (described in Platonic terms as *thymoïdes* and *epithymêtikon*) are themselves irrational (*alogoi*) and are acquired through habituation.<sup>82</sup> There is every reason to believe that Poseidonius considered the excellence of the appetitive soul to be sophrosyne, although no extant fragment actually attests to this belief.<sup>83</sup> Its function would be to render the *epithymêtikon* obedient to the rational element in the soul—a most essential function, since according to Poseidonius the cause of the passions lies in the failure of the irrational faculties to obey the rational.<sup>84</sup> More original is another statement, preserved by Galen, who reports that Poseidonius held the cause of the passions to be “not following in every respect the *daimôn* in oneself which is akin to and has a nature like that of the *daimôn* which governs the entire cosmos, but following instead the inferior and bestial element.”<sup>85</sup> This statement in turn should be taken in conjunction with the doctrine about the *telos* ascribed to Poseidonius by Clement of Alexandria: “To live in contemplation of the truth and order [*taxis*] of the cosmos and to fashion oneself in so far as possible according to this, being led astray in no respect by the irrational element of the soul.”<sup>86</sup>

From these three doctrines arose the special importance of sophrosyne

<sup>81</sup> These are called *δυνάμεις*, rather than *μέρη* or *εἴδη*, as in Plato. Galen, *op. cit.*: Kühn V. 454–55, Müller 432, 9–15; and Seneca *Ep.* 92. 8. See Karl Reinhardt, “Poseidonius,” P. W., Vol. 22. 1, pp. 739 ff., on Poseidonius’ theory of the soul and its faculties, and their relation to the passions.

<sup>82</sup> Galen, *op. cit.*: Kühn V. 466–68, 429, VII. 589; and Müller 444, 11–447, 4; 405, 5–14; 583, 15–584, 10. On methods of imparting virtue, see Seneca *Ep.* 95, 65–66; note especially the use of *exempla* for teaching *temperantia*. Poseidonius refers to the Platonic myth of the charioteer and his two horses in discussing the different ways of instilling rational and irrational virtue (Galen, *op. cit.*: Kühn V. 466–68, Müller 445, 15–446, 3 and 447, 1–3). On the consequences for education of Poseidonius’ psychology, see Karl Reinhardt, *Poseidonius* (Munich, 1921), 313 ff.

<sup>83</sup> Reinhardt (P. W. 743), discussing the influence of Poseidonius on later Platonists, cites Albinus’ definition of sophrosyne as the virtue of the *epithymêtikon* (*Didask.* 29, see below, n. 105). Poseidonius’ principal contribution to the history of this virtue may be that he lent his authority to the interpretation of sophrosyne as the excellence of the appetitive element alone, rather than of the entire soul. As we shall find (n. 105), most of the philosophical schools of the Empire agree on this doctrine.

<sup>84</sup> Galen, *op. cit.*: Kühn IV. 377–79 and Müller 348, 5–350, 13. Cf. also Kühn V. 429 and Müller 405, 5–14. The passions are not judgments of the rational faculty of the soul, nor even consequences of such judgments, as the Old Stoic had taught, but arise in the irrational faculties. Virtue depends on the right understanding of the passions; consult Ludwig Edelstein, *A.J.P.* 57 (1936), 286–325, especially 305 ff.

<sup>85</sup> Galen, *op. cit.*: Kühn V. 469–76 and Müller 448, 11–456, 14.

<sup>86</sup> Strom. 2. 21. 129. 1–5 (II. 183, 10 Stählin).

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