

[H. North. Sôphrosune. Chapter VII - suite]

Auteur : Foucault, Michel

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example, drawing upon Poseidonius, describes the sophrosyne of the early Romans and cites Scipio Africanus as an example. Since he praises the simplicity and frugality of Scipio, in contrast to the extravagance of Lucullus, who after his victory over Mithridates abandoned sophrosyne and introduced luxury (*tryphê*) to Rome (6. 105. 274 f.), it is clear that Poseidonius' conception of sophrosyne included moderation and restraint, even though it is impossible to prove that the actual word sophrosyne which appears here and in similar passages goes back to Poseidonius himself.⁹¹

A similar interpretation of the virtue prevails in the writings of the Later Stoa,⁹² whose most notable representatives—Musonius Rufus,

⁹¹ Other passages that reveal Poseidonius' concept of sophrosyne as it affects conduct include Athenaeus 5. 211E–215B (on the behavior of the Peripatetic philosopher Athenion) and Strabo 3. 2. 9 (a diatribe against gold and silver) and 7. 3. 2–7 (on the habits of the Mysians). The last passage, which comments on the relation of justice to sophrosyne, interprets sophrosyne in terms of *autarkeia* and *lilotês* and compares extreme self-restraint to the Cynic way of life. For a variety of passages in Cicero, Plutarch, Diodorus, and others that may reflect the views of Poseidonius about sophrosyne and allied virtues in the State or in statesmen, consult Margaret Reesor, *The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa* (New York, 1951), 35 ff. Two further beliefs about virtue ascribed to Poseidonius by Diogenes Laertius affect his view of sophrosyne. Like Panaetius, he denies that *aretê* alone suffices for happiness (on this problem, see Seneca *Ep.* 92 and the comments by Annelise Modrzejewski, *loc. cit.*) and requires in addition health, affluence, and strength (D. L. 7. 128); and he recognizes four divisions of *aretê* (7. 92), probably the four cardinal virtues.

⁹² Among the other representatives of the Middle Stoa, Hecato alone possesses some importance for sophrosyne, by reason of his emphasis on *enkrateia* as a virtue parallel to sophrosyne (related to it as *fortitudo* is related to *magnitudo animi*) and his contribution to the Stoic doctrine of theoretical and nontheoretical virtue. For the influence of Hecato on Cicero (especially in *Off.* III), on Seneca (in his lost *De Officiis*), and on Martin of Bracara (in various passages of his *Formula Vitae Honestae* where *continentia* is either added to *temperantia* or takes its place in the tetrad), see Heinz Gomoll, *Der stoische Philosoph Hecaton* (Leipzig, 1933), with the comments of Gauthier, 141 n. 2, 150 n. 1, 161 n. 2. The distinction between theoretical and nontheoretical virtue, ascribed to Hecato by Diogenes Laertius (7. 90), is referred to by Cicero *T.D.* 4. 30 (a discussion of *sanitas animi* and its relation to sophrosyne) and Stobaeus II. 62. 15 (on the distinction between *technai* or *epistêmata*—the cardinal virtues—and *dynamis*, which are beauty, health, and strength of soul). It is important to distinguish Hecato's use of the terms *epistêmê* and *dynamis* from that of Poseidonius: to Poseidonius theoretical virtue (*epistêmê*) is the perfection of the rational faculty of the soul—i.e., *phronêsis*. The virtues of the irrational faculties (*andreia* and sophrosyne) are *dynamis* (nontheoretical). To Hecato all four cardinal virtues are theoretical; the *dynamis* are the counterparts (*simulacra virtutum*) which appear in those whose virtue is not yet perfect. What the Middle Stoa tends to call theoretical and nontheoretical virtue is comparable to the distinction between perfect (*teleia*) and imperfect (*euphyia*) virtues found in the Middle Academy and among the later Platonists of the second century after Christ. The relevant passages in Cicero, Stobaeus, and Diogenes Laertius and the differences among members of the Middle Stoa on this doctrine are discussed by Robert Philippson, *Philol.* 85 (1930), 357–413; Dryoff, *op. cit.*; Arnold, *op. cit.*, 105; and Gomoll, 39 n. 1. August Schmekel (*Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* [Berlin, 1892], 290) denies that the Stobaeus passage derives from Hecato.

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