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ments. There are, in general, two ways of being ἐρωτικός: κατὰ τὸ σῶμα and κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν (206 BC); the author leaves no doubt, that the latter is the superior way; those who are pregnant κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν engender φρόνησις and other virtues; but those who are bodily pregnant turn to the women, and are ἐρωτικός in this way: by begetting children they acquire an immortality (ἀθανασίαν), a memorial, and a state of bliss, which in their imagination they for all succeeding time procure (208E). This passage from the Symp. shows that one of the ways, and certainly not the most superior, in which the Eros for immortality seeks satisfaction, is the begetting of children. Mortal man has a kind of identity by the continuous succession of generations. Actually, though the emphasis in the argument clearly lies on the Eros of the individual, there is no question here of personal immortality. The immortality in which individual man has part, is, in fact, the immortality of the human race, which in its turn is based on the eternity and immortality of the process of γέννησις.

This idea is more clearly expressed in Nom. 4, 721C; in this passage Plato deals with the marriage-laws, which should be the first laws in the state. Marriage, it is argued here, is the way by which the human race, by nature's ordinance, shares in immortality, a thing for which nature has implanted in everyone a keen desire. The desire to win glory, instead of being anonymous after one's death, aims at such an object. He then goes on:

"Thus mankind is by nature coeval (συμφυῆς) with the whole of time, in that it accompanies it continually both now and in the future; and the means by which it is immortal is this: by leaving behind it children's children and continuing ever one and the same, it thus by reproduction (γένεσις) shares in immortality"².

Here again, the personal desire (ἐπιθυμία) for immortality is not entirely absent; but the fulfilment of this desire is only safeguarded by the identity of the human race itself, i.e. the identity that is characteristic of mortal nature, based on the process of successive generation in time. In another passage of Nom. Plato compares this process with the passing on of torches (6, 776B).

We deduce from these texts that, at least in this context, sharing in immortality means: contributing to the process of γέννησις which guarantees the identity-through-successive-generation of the human race. At the root of this contribution lies Eros as a desire for immortality.

There is another interesting point in the text from Nom. that needs to be underlined. Plato says, that the human race is coeval with the whole of time; he seems to suggest, that there is a link between partaking in immortality by means of engendering on the one hand, and the motion of time on the other. We do not go too far, therefore, if we admit that this view of time and immortality by the process of reproduction, as developed in Symp. and Nom., has to be connected with what the same author says in Tim. 37D-38C on the origin of time—in spite of the difference in terminology (eternity in Tim., immortality in Symp. and Nom.) The Father of the world wants it to be what he himself is as its model: eternal (αἰδιον), but this was impossible; that is why he devised to make a movable image of moveless eternity: this image is what we call time. Change and γένεσις do not apply to eternity, but they are characteristic of time. This conception of time as an image of eternity, implies also a positive appreciation of the realm of γένεσις. It seems to me, that the passage from Tim. explains why in Symp. the process of γένεσις (or γέννησις) can be seen as the way to immortality that is fitting for mortal nature. There is some analogy between the identity (τὸ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι Symp. 208A) of the divine, or the eternal living, and the identity-by-successive-engendering of mortal nature, i.e. between eternity

2. The translation is R. G. BURY's, in the *Loeb Classical Libr.*, London, 1926, p. 313.



There are, in general, two ways of being identical: one is when two things are identical in the same way (e.g. the number two is identical to the number two); the other is when two things are identical in different ways (e.g. the number two is identical to the number two, but the number two is not identical to the number one). In the first case, the things are identical in the same way, and in the second case, they are identical in different ways. The first case is called 'numerical identity' and the second case is called 'qualitative identity'. Numerical identity is the identity of things in the same way, and qualitative identity is the identity of things in different ways. Numerical identity is the identity of things in the same way, and qualitative identity is the identity of things in different ways. Numerical identity is the identity of things in the same way, and qualitative identity is the identity of things in different ways.

This idea is more clearly expressed in the following passage from the *Metaphysics* (1026a 30-31): "The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways." This passage shows that the same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity.

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We deduce from this that, at least in this context, identity is not identical to itself. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity.

There is another interesting point in the text from which this idea is deduced. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity. The same thing can be identical to itself in different ways. This is the idea of qualitative identity.

The passage in the *Metaphysics* is 1026a 30-31.